CHAPTER X ON-BASE OFFENSES by Stanger, Roland J.
International Law Studies – Volume 52 
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces 





















The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.  
CHAPTER X
ON-BASE OFFENSES
The concept of the "base," * although it finds no place in the
NATO Agreement, has been widely used in other status of forces
agreements. It has a longer history than the inter se concept.
Oppenheim 2 was the most influential among a significant
minority of text writers 3 who took the position that visiting
1 The word "base" seems more appropriate under modern conditions than
the word "camp," commonly used in earlier discussions. As used here, it is
intended to cover areas of all kinds set apart for the exclusive or primary
use of the visiting forces.
2 His much quoted statement was
:
"Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the service of
their home State, they are considered exterritorial and remain, there-
fore, under its jurisdiction. A crime committed on foreign territory
by a member of these forces cannot be punished by the local civil or
military authorities, but only by the commanding officer of the force
or by other authorities of their own State. This rule, however, applies
only in case the crime is committed either within the place where the
force is stationed or in some place where the criminal was on duty; it
does not apply, if, for example, soldiers belonging to a foreign garrison
of a fortress leave the rayon of the fortress not on duty but for recrea-
tion and pleasure and then and there commit a crime. The local au-
thorities are in that case competent to punish them." 1 Oppenheim,
International Law 759 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
However, in the latest, eighth edition, the editor notes that this is the view
of some only; and that "* * * the view which has the support of the bulk
of practice is that in principle members of visiting forces are subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of local courts, and that any derogations from that
principle require specific agreement of the local State by treaty or other-
wise." 1 Oppenheim, International Law 848 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
Oppenheim's view was expressly rejected by Cassels, J. in Rex v. Nauratil,
England, High Court, Warwick Assizes, March 11, 1942, upholding British
jurisdiction where the defendant was a Czech sergeant, the victim a Czech
subject, and the offence occurred in the barrack-room. [1919-1942] Ann. Dig.
(Supp. Vol.) 161 (No. 85).
8 "Such a concession should always be considered as an act of comity, and
ought to be harmonized with the security and tranquility of the state, in
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forces were immune from local criminal jurisdiction with respect
to offenses committed within but not outside their quarters or
camps. A related position was taken in the Bustamante Code. 4
In so far as the immunity of visiting forces for on-base offenses
was explained through the fiction of extraterritoriality—and with
some, including Oppenheim, the fiction appears to have been a
such fashion, always, that the organization of the army and military dis-
cipline are not imperiled.
"It is clear that the territorial sovereign implicitly renounces jurisdic-
tion over the places occupied by the army during the time it is quartered
there, and that also, in that which concerns military offenses and offenses
de droit commun committed within the perimeter of the camp, the jurisdic-
tion of the state to which the army belongs should prevail. The reason
is that the state exists morally where the military power which represents
it is found, and that the concession on the part of the other state implies in
fact the temporary suspension of the exercise of jurisdiction over the terri-
tory occupied by the army.
"It ought, on the other hand, to be true that persons who belong to the
army fall under the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign, if they com-
mitted in isolation, and outside the perimeter where the army is quartered,
acts which concern laws of police and territorial security. It is beyond
doubt that in this case the territorial sovereign has the right to judge such
persons, because it has not abandoned its rights of jurisdiction in that which
concerns the individuals who compose the army, uti singuli, but in that
which concerns the army, uti universitas." 1 Fiore, Nouveau Droit Inter-
national Public 468-469 (Antoine trans., 2d ed., 1885). See also Fiore,
International Law Codified 220-221 (5th ed., Borchard trans., 1918).
"In the absence of special agreement the troops would not be amenable
to the local law, but would be under the jurisdiction of their own com-
manders, as long as they remained within their own lines or were away on
duty, but not otherwise." Lawrence, The Principles of International Law
225 (7th ed. 1925).
* Article 299 of the Bustamante Code, annexed to the Convention on Pri-
vate International Law, Final Act of the Sixth International Conference
of American States, 1928, at 16, provided: "Nor are the penal laws of a
State applicable to offenses committed en el perimetro de las operaciones
militares, when it authorizes the passage through its territory of an army
of another contracting State, save when they have no legal relation with
that army." Barton states, 1954 Brit. Yb. InVl L. 344, that the article was
based on Article 140 of a prior draft Code, the work of Pessoa, and ap-
proved by a subcommittee of the Committee of Jurists of the Pan-American
Union at Rio de Janeiro in 1912, which used the phrase "en el recinto del
campamento," rather than "en el perimetro de las operaciones militares,"
and would have accorded immunity from local jurisdiction with respect to
all offenses committed in that area except those committed by one local
citizen against another.
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factor—it has lost its footing. 5 Rejection of that fiction in the
case of embassies has led to the conclusion that there is no im-
munity for offenses committed there. 6 If one accepts the sugges-
tion that embassies and bases are entirely analogous, the conclu-
sion would follow that there was no immunity for on-base
offenses. It can be said, however, that military exigency requires
granting immunity to an armed force, if not to the individuals
who compose it, when it has the character of an organized body
of men, and it has that character on a base. The analogy, it can
be argued, is much closer to that of the crew of a warship while
on board than to the staff of an embassy. 7 The base may, more-
over, constitute a community apart, at least to a degree, from the
community of the receiving state.
Advocates of both complete immunity and of no immunity for
visiting forces have criticized the intermediate position, granting
immunity only for "on-base" offenses. They object that, al-
though immunity for "on-base" offenses may have made sense
when visiting forces garrisoned a fortress, 8 it does not under
6 Both Barton, 1954 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 349, who rejects the fiction, and the
U.S. Memorandum, which refers to it with seeming approval as one of the
bases for complete immunity, Hearings Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 309, Part I, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 417 (1955),
point out that a consistent application of the fiction would not result in
according immunity only for the acts of visiting forces in their camps.
Barton points out that it would logically give immunity to any person who
committed an offense in a camp. Both Barton and the Memorandum state it
would require according immunity to a soldier wherever he was, on what
Barton refers to as a "walking island" theory—a much more dubious
proposition.
6 "The ground occupied by an embassy is not the territory of the foreign
State. * * * The lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts there committed is deter-
mined by the territorial sovereign. If an attache commits an offense within
the precincts of an embassy, his immunity from prosecution is not because
he has not violated the local law, but rather for the reason that the in-
dividual is exempt from prosecution. If a person not so exempt, or whose
immunity is waived, similarly commits a crime therein, the territorial
sovereign, if it secures custody of the offender, may subject him to prosecu-
tion, even though its criminal code normally does not contemplate the
punishment of one who commits an offense outside of the national domain."
2 Hyde, International Law 1285-86 (2d ed. 1948).
7 Ministere Public v. Tsoukharis, Egypt, Mixed Court of Cassation, Feb.
8, 1943, [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 40) ; Chung Chi Cheung v. The
King [1939] A.C. 160 (P.C.). See Fiore, op. cit. supra, note 3.
8 "This supposed rule of place * * * probably arose out of the garrisoning
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modern conditions of total war 9 and is too vague and indefinite
to permit practical application.10
There is weight to these objections, and in any event Oppen-
heim's position never achieved such wide acceptance as to give
it the status of a rule of international law.11 There is, however, a
of troops in places particularly limited or denned by agreement. These
garrisons were admitted for the protection of weak states, or to assure the
carrying out of some treaty provisions or other obligation. Of course, in
such a case, the military authorities would not have exterritorial jurisdic-
tion over their forces outside of the area denned, since such forces would
not have the consent of the local sovereign to be outside of such area." U.S.
Memorandum, Hearings on H.J. Res. 309, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 416.
•Barton, 1952 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 12; King, 36 A.J.I.L. 559 (1942); U.S.
Memorandum, Hearings on H.J. Res. 309, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 416;
Canadian Factum, id., p. 431.
10 U.S. Memorandum, Hearings on H.J. Res. 309, op. cit. supra, note 5, at
416; Canadian Factum, id., at 431. Barton notes the argument, 1954 Brit.
Yb. Int'l L. 350, that permission to occupy an area may be considered an
implied grant of the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses
committed within the area by the visiting forces, and concludes "When
the grant of an area * * * actually amounts to a lease or an occupation
license, there may be strong arguments in favour of the view that the writ
of the local sovereign does not run within that area. Agreements relating
to the peaceful military occupation of territory would seem to support such
arguments. But where the grant of an area for the use of the visiting
forces falls short of such a disposition of territory, there would appear to
be no justification for concluding that the juridical consequences of an
intra-castral offence committed by a member of a visiting force differ from
those of any other offence. The absence of this distinction, as a test for
determining whether jurisdiction ought to be exercised, from all the jurisdic-
tional agreements concluded during the Second World War, and, of even
greater significance, from the multilateral agreements concluded within the
last ten years, may, it seems, be acceptable as cogent evidence not only
that the differentiation has no place in international law, but also that
it has no utility in practice."
That the form employed in making an area available for occupation by
visiting forces can be described as a lease or license may not be irrelevant,
but other factors more directly related to the interests of the states con-
cerned and to the recognized bases of jurisdiction and of immunities, appear
entitled to greater weight.
11
It will be recalled that Oppenheim's position appears largely to have
shaped the British attitude in the World War I Anglo-American negotia-
tions, and again in World War II.
The Mixed Courts of Egypt were prepared to recognize an immunity so
limited, seemingly influenced in part by the analogy of warships and their
crews. See Manuel v. Ministere Public, Court of Cassation [1943-1945] Ann.
Dig., No. 42; Suclozav v. Ministere Public, Journal des Tribunaux Mixtes,
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wide gulf between saying that international law does not and
should not accord exclusive jurisdiction to a sending state for
on-base offenses, and saying that the concept of a base "has no
utility in practice." On the contrary, there is much reason for
saying that the difference between the situation on and off a
base is significant enough to justify a different allocation of
jurisdiction over offenses committed on and those committed off
a base. The difference need not be between exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the sending state for on-base offenses and in the receiving
state for off-base offenses.
The appropriateness of utilizing the concept of a base in allo-
cating jurisdiction has been recognized in a significant number of
status of forces agreements. The United States, early in the
century, by treaty acquired with respect to the Canal Zone 12
August 24-25, 1945, No. 3504, p. 3. Judge Brinton notes that "The claim [of
complete immunity] was rejected in favor of the principle which limits
exemption to offenses committed within military precincts or while the mem-
bers of the forces were engaged in the execution of a military duty." "The
Egyptian Mixed Courts and Foreign Armed Forces," 40 A.J.I.L. 737, 739
(1946). Barton suggests, 1954 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 346, that this seeming
willingness to recognize the limited immunity may have been prompted by an
"assimilation of the camps of the other foreign forces stationed in Egypt" to
the British camps, covered by the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of August 26,
1936, U.K.T.S., No. 6 (1937). The Convention provided in Article 5 that
"Without prejudice to the fact that British camps are Egyptian territory,
the said camps shall be inviolable and shall be subject to the exclusive con-
trol and authority of the Appropriate British Authority." The Mixed Court,
however, had no difficulty in distinguishing between the status of the forces
of other countries and British forces with respect to offenses committed out-
side camps, and the immunity of the British forces with respect to such
offenses stems from the same treaty.
On the other hand, several of the early cases which came before the
Mixed Court involved sailors from warships in Egyptian harbors, and the
analogy may well have suggested itself. Barton, supra, at 347.
Colonel King vigorously criticized the decisions of the Mixed Courts on the
ground, among others, that they "applied to land troops a resolution relating
only to naval forces." 40 A.J.I.L. 260 (1946).
12 The Convention of February 26, 1904 with Panama, 2 Malloy, Treaties,
etc., 1349 (1910), provided in Article III that "The Republic of Panama
grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the
zone * * * which the United States would possess and exercise if it were
the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and water are
located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama
of any such sovereign rights, power or authority."
The Convention also granted the United States certain rights outside the
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and sites for naval bases in Cuba (Guantanamo Bay) 13 and
Nicaragua, 14 exclusive jurisdiction not only over offenses com-
mitted by its forces, but over all offenses committed in the
designated areas. None of these agreements contained any ex-
press provision regarding offenses committed by American forces
outside the designated areas, and it is understood that the United
States does not claim exclusive jurisdiction with respect to such
offenses. 15
More important, the first of the World War II agreements on
jurisdiction, the Anglo-American agreement of March 27, 1941
relating to the Leased Bases, in significant degree made jurisdic-
tion depend on whether the offense occurred within or without a
Leased Area. With respect to American troops, and the civilian
component, the United States was given primary jurisdiction over
security offenses, and offenses within a Leased Area ; it had only
concurrent jurisdiction over other offenses. 16 When the Leased
Zone, including, in Article VII, the "right and authority * * * for the
maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the
territories and harbors adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama
should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such
order," and in Article XXIII the right to use its police and its land and
naval forces for the safety and protection of the Canal if it should become
necessary. Article XVI contemplated the making of arrangements for
delivery to Panama of persons who committed offenses outside the Zone and
were found in the Zone.
18 The Agreement of February 23, 1903, 1 Malloy, Treaties, etc., 359
(1910) provided in Article III:
"While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance
of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above
described areas of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of
Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation by the United
States of said areas * * * the United States shall exercise complete
jurisdiction and control over and within said areas * * *."
The Lease of July 2, 1903, id., at 360, provided in Article 4 for delivery
of fugitives from justice charged with crimes or misdemeanors against
Cuban law who took refuge within the areas.
"See the Canal Convention of August 5, 1914, (Art. 2) 39 Stat. 1661.
No base was established pursuant to the rights granted by the treaty.
15 See the statement of General Hickman, infra, page 218, note 13.
16 Article IV provided in part that in any case in which "(B) A British
subject shall be charged with having committed any such [security] offence
within a leased area and shall be apprehended therein; or (C) A person
other than a British subject shall be charged with having committed an
offence of any other nature within a leased area, the United States shall
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Bases agreement was revised in 1950, whether an offense oc-
curred within or without a leased area was again taken into
account in allocating jurisdiction. 17
have the absolute right in the first instance to assume and exercise jurisdic-
tion with respect to such offence."
The phrase "A person other than a British subject" included a member
of the American forces, and since the agreement did not expressly state who
should have jurisdiction over offenses off a leased area, the implication was
clear that jurisdiction over such offenses was to be concurrent.
Another World War II agreement, that of March 31, 1942 with Liberia,
23 UNTS 302 (1948-49), gave the United States exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by others than Liberian nationals on the airports and
other defense areas established in Liberia. It also granted exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the United States over United States military and civilian personnel
and their families for offenses outside the defense areas.
Article 2 provided
:
"The Republic of Liberia retains sovereignty over all such airports,
fortifications and other defense areas as may be established under the rights
above granted. The Government of the United States during the life of this
Agreement shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any such airports and de-
fense areas in Liberia and over the military and civilian personnel of the
Government of the United States and their families within the airports,
fortifications and other defense areas, as well as over all other persons
within such areas except Liberian citizens.
"It is understood, however, that the Government of the United States may
turn over to the Liberian authorities for trial and punishment any person
committing an offense in such defense areas. And the Liberian authorities
will turn over to the United States authorities for trial and punishment any
of the United States military or civilian personnel and their families who
may commit offenses outside such defense areas. The Liberian authorities
and the United States authorities will take adequate measures to insure the
prosecution and punishment in cases of conviction of all such offenders, it
being understood that the relevant evidence shall be furnished reciprocally
to the two authorities."
17 The United States is by Article IV (1) given:
"(a) Where the accused is a member of a United States force,*******
(ii) if a state of war does not exist, exclusive jurisdiction over security
offences wherever committed and United States interest offenses committed
inside the Leased Areas; concurrent jurisdiction over all other offenses
wherever committed.*******
(c) Where the accused is not a member of a United States force, a
British subject or a local alien, but is a person subject to United States
military or naval law,*******
(ii) if a state of war does not exist and there is no civil court of the
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The Agreement of March 17, 1947 with the Philippines gives
the United States the right to use certain bases in the Philippines.
The provisions of the Agreement on jurisdiction 18 give much
greater reach to the on-base concept than the revised Leased
Bases Agreements. The United States has jurisdiction 19 over
all offenses committed on a base, by and against whomever they
may be committed "except where the offender and offended
parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed
forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is
against the security of the Philippines." United States jurisdic-
tion, in other words, reaches beyond the furthest point to which
the inter se concept can carry—an offense by a member of the
armed forces, the civilian component or a dependent against a
person in any of those groups—to include both an offense by a
person in any of those groups against a stranger to the American
forces, including a Philippine citizen, whether committed in the
United States sitting in the Territory, exclusive jurisdiction over security
offenses which are not punishable under the law of the Territory, concurrent
jurisdiction over all other offenses committed inside the Leased Areas."
Other provisions, e.g., Article IV (l)(b), (l)(c), iii, 1(d), as well as
those relating to jurisdiction in time of war also distinguish between offenses
committed within and without a leased area.
The Agreement relating to the Bahama Islands Long Range Proving
Ground, contains almost identical provisions.
The Leased Bases Agreement was modified by an Exchange of Notes of
February 13, 1952 and March 14, 1952 between the United States and
Canada, 3 UST 4271 (1952), with respect to the bases in Newfoundland.
Subsequently, by an Exchange of Notes of April 28, 1952 and April 30, 1952
between the United States and Canada, 5 UST 2139, TIAS 3074, 235
U.N.T.S. 270 (1956), it was agreed that the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment should be made applicable to all United States forces in Canada, the
United States Note stating that "Both the United States Government and
the Canadian Government agree that uniform treatment of United States
forces throughout Canada under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement
would be in the interest of both countries and would make for simplification
of administration.
18 Article XIII. The United States personnel employed in the military
assistance program in the Philippines under the Agreement of March 21,
1947 for military assistance, 45 U.N.T.S. 47 (1949-50) and 70 U.N.T.S. 280
(1950) are by an Exchange of Notes of February 24, March 11 and 13,
1950, 82 U.N.T.S. 332 (1951), given "the privileges and immunities accorded
to accredited United States personnel of that Embassy."
19 Interpreted, in People v. Acierto, Philippines, Sup. Ct., Jan. 30, 1953,
Int. L. Rep. 1953, 148 as only "prior or preferential but not exclusive."
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performance of duty or not and, nominally, by a stranger to the
American forces, including a Philippine citizen, against a person
in any of those groups.
The jurisdiction of the United States with respect to off-base
offenses is, on the other hand, very limited.20 It embraces only
(1) the narrowest range of inter se offenses, i.e., those in which
both the offender and the victim are members of the armed
forces; (2) security offenses; and (3) offenses committed by a
member of the armed forces (not the civilian component) "while
engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty."
There has been much objection on the Philippine side to the
provisions regarding jurisdiction over on-base offenses. Negotia-
tions for the revision of the Agreement have been going on in-
termittently since 1956. A resolution of the Philippine Senate in
March 1959 asked for Philippine jurisdiction over all cases
arising on the bases, but recognized there might be justifiable
exceptions.21 It may be assumed that the Philippines' concern is
primarily due to the fact that the United States has exclusive
jurisdiction over off-duty offenses by Americans against Philip-
pine citizens, and, nominally, over offenses by others than Ameri-
cans, committed on the bases. It was reported that the United
States was prepared to accede to the Philippines' position on these
points, but a second issue—who should determine whether an
offense was committed in the performance of duty—was not re-
solved.22
The Agreement with the Dominican Republic of November 26,
1951, which related to the Long Range Proving Ground, re-
sembled the Philippines Agreement in its allocation of jurisdic-
80 The Agreement contemplates that the local fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
may waive the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines "over all other offenses
committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces," and if he
does so the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. Article XIII, 4.
21 The resolution, as published in the Manila press on March 22, 1959,
asked in part for
:
"2. Application of the laws of the Philippines in the military bases.
"3. Jurisdiction of Philippine courts over all cases arising in the
military bases, including criminal offenses committed by military per-
sonnel in violation of Philippine laws, and if justifiable exceptions are
recognized, the final determination of whether a particular case is within
the exception must rest in Philippine authorities."
" The New York Times, May 10, 1959, p. 25, col. 3.
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tion with respect to on-base offenses. 23 The exclusive jurisdiction
granted the United States was narrower in that it extended only
to those subject to United States military law, but when one sub-
ject to that law committed an offense on a Site, the nationality of
the victim and whether the offense was committed in the per-
formance of duty were irrelevant. The exclusive jurisdiction
granted the United States over off-base offenses was, however,
much more extensive than under the Philippines Agreement. It
had such jurisdiction except where the victim was a Dominican
national or local alien; in the excepted cases, the Mixed Military
Commission decided who should exercise jurisdiction.
The Agreement with Libya of September 9, 1954 is like the
Dominican Agreement in that exclusive American jurisdiction
is limited to "members of the United States forces" but with re-
spect to such persons extends to all offenses "committed solely
within the agreed areas." With respect to jurisdiction over off-
base offenses the Libyan Agreement is in form like the Philip-
pines Agreement. The term "members of the United States
forces" is, however, so broadly defined that every inter se offense,
in the widest connotation of that term, and every offense com-
mitted by any American in the performance of duty is subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. In substance,
therefore, the Libyan Agreement more nearly parallels the
Dominican Agreement with respect to off-base offenses also.
The Agreement with Saudi Arabia concerning the Dhahran
Airfield 24 comes nearest to allocating jurisdiction entirely in
terms of the place of the offense. It grants the United States
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by United States
military personnel (narrowly defined) within a prescribed area;
Saudi Arabia has concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed
outside that area. The Agreement is unusual, however, in that
the prescribed area includes not only the base but also certain
described areas outside the base. It is understood that these
areas comprise all those to which United States military person-
nel may properly go, and no American soldier has ever been
tried by a Saudi Arabian court.
The Agreements cited which assign some role to the concept of
a base in allocating jurisdiction by no means give it the same role.
" Article XV.
14 Par. 13, Exchange of Notes Between the United States and Saudi Arabia
Concerning an Air Base at Dhahran, June 18, 1951. 2 UST 1466; TIAS 2290.
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One would not expect they would, and the variations do not in-
dicate that the concept has no proper role in allocating juris-
diction.
The term "base" has no single meaning, and many factors are
relevant to the issue of whether, in any particular instance, a
different allocation of jurisdiction over on-base and off-base
offenses is appropriate. The base may be a naval base, an air
base, a military headquarters or a housing area. The com-
mander of the visiting forces may be in sole command on the
base, or share command with an officer of the local forces. The
visiting forces alone may occupy the base, or share it with a con-
tingent of the local forces. The base may be physically separate
from the surrounding area—even remote from any other in-
habited area—or a building or only a part of a building in a city.
Facilities may be built and the visiting forces supplied largely
with materials and supplies brought from abroad, or the base may
draw heavily on the local economy. Many, few or even no local
inhabitants may be employed on the base. Likenesses or differ-
ences in language, culture, race and religion, physical proximity
and the availability of transportation facilities may encourage or
discourage intermingling of the visiting forces and the local in-
habitants. Many combinations of these factors can so set the
base apart from the surrounding area as to justify a different
treatment of the problem of criminal jurisdiction on and off
the base.
The above suggests, therefore, that a base—particularly one of
the character of a naval or air base—is an integrated unit, an in-
strumentality of the sending state, manned by an organized body
of men, engaged in a common, coordinated effort, analogous to a
warship. It can be said, then, that any exercise of jurisdiction by
the local authorities within a base, or with respect to acts which
occur within a base by those who man it, will in some degree in-
terfere with the effective operation of the base. There is, then, a
functional reason, more compelling than can be invoked with
respect to offenses committed by a member of the armed forces
when he is not on a base, for according the sending state exclu-
sive jurisdiction over on-base offenses.
The soundness of this approach can be better judged if one
bears in mind that the concept of a base is material in other
contexts. Also involved are such matters as the control of land,
sea and air traffic to and in the area, control over the importa-
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tion, sale and taxation of goods and materials, immigration, the
applicability of local labor laws and many other matters which
likewise bear on the effective operation of the base.
Additionally, it can be said that those who man a base, par-
ticularly if they are also housed there, constitute a more or less
separate community, and offenses within that community do not
disturb the "peace of the port.
,,
It is useful in this regard to bear
in mind the reasons of policy, rather than abstract principle, dis-
cussed in the first chapter, which support the territorial principle.
Broadly, they relate to the responsibility of the state for the wel-
fare of those within its borders. To the extent that a base is a
community apart, the responsibility and correlative concern of
the receiving state is in fact diminished and that of the sending
state increased. This in no way implies that the receiving state
is not "sovereign" in the base area. The reference is to a
sociological and not a political fact.
It may be said that this simply restates the problem of the
inter se offense, and there is no occasion to complicate that prob-
lem by bringing in the matter of the place of the offense. It is
submitted that the two concepts are, rather, correlative. There
is a difference between an altercation between two members of a
visiting force on a base, and between the same two men in a local
pub. There is also a difference between an altercation between a
member of a visiting force and a non-member on a base, and be-
tween the same two men in a local pub. The inter se concept
covers the first pair of these situations; if the offense is com-
mitted on base, the on-base concept reinforces the inter se con-
cept.25 This concept does not cover the second pair of situations,
but it can still be argued that if the accused is a member of the
visiting force and the offense is committed on base, the sending
state should have jurisdiction, even though the victim is not a
member of the force and, presumably, is a national of the re-
ceiving state. Nothing in Reid v. Covert 26 affects this situation,
if the accused is a member of the armed forces rather than of
the civilian component or a dependent. If, however, the accused
is a non-member of the armed forces and particularly if he is also
" It is with respect to offences which are both inter se and on base that
the United States is given exclusive jurisdiction under Procedural Agree-
ment No. 16 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements with Spain, Paragraph
7, quoted supra p. 195, note 28.
29 Supra, p. 157, note 2.
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a national of the receiving state, the argument for allocating
jurisdiction to the sending state merely because the offense oc-
curred on base becomes very weak indeed, even if the victim
was a member of the force. It also seems clear that a United
States court-martial could not in any event try the accused. Reid
v. Covert and its companion cases all arose under Article 2 (11)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Article 2 (12) makes
subject to the Code "persons within an area leased by or other-
wise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which
is under the control of the Secretary concerned * * *." 27 If a
United States court-martial cannot try a member of the civilian
component or a dependent, it can hardly try an alien who is
neither. Nor would the fact that the offense occurred on a base
appear to make a material difference. Such an extension of the
Insular Cases 28 is not to be anticipated.
The significance of the on-base concept for other purposes than
those discussed here, e.g., on the right to exercise the power to
police, will be taken up in a later chapter.
27 70A Stat. 37, 10 U.S.C.A. 802.
28
1 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, c. xxxi (2d
ed., 1929).

